Order of Presentation at Trial by Walker, Laurens et al.
Order of Presentation at Trial*
Laurens Walkert John Thibaut,$ and Virginia Andreoli*
The order of evidence in an adversary proceeding has an important
effect upon the final determination of guilt or innocence. This effect
is complicated by the fact that the adversary process is ordered in two
distinct ways: a "gross order" of presentation by each party; and, with-
in this gross order, an "internal order" for the presentation of each
party's case.
Gross order is determined by statute and judicial decision for the
three parts of the traditional adversary process: opening statements,
presentations of evidence, and closing arguments. The prosecution or
plaintiff usually has the right to make the first opening statement,
present evidence first, and make both the first and the final closing
arguments. The usual justification for this ordering is that the party
with the burden of proof should have the advantage of making the
first and last presentation.1
There is, however, no established internal order for adversary pro-
ceedings; such ordering is typically left entirely to the participants.
Nevertheless, most practitioners normally save their strongest, most
convincing evidence for last. The usual justification for this strategy
is that it is the most dramatic way to present one's case and that the
jury or fact-finder will remember the strongest evidence more vividly.
One trial specialist suggests, for example, that the order of witnesses
be arranged to "lead up to a climax with no anticlimax." 2
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1. See, e.g., Judge Blumenfeld's opinion in U.S. ex rel. Parsons v. Adams, 536 F.
Supp. 340 (D. Conn. 1971), in which he states that although it could be assumed
that the Connecticut practice of permitting the prosecution in criminal trials to both
open and close final argument gives the prosecution a potential advantage, the usual
justification for the practice is that the party with the burden of proof should have
the advantage of opening and closing final argument. This practice, adopted by most
jurisdictions, may constitute a minor defect in the otherwise ideal ordering sug.
gested by this Article. See p. 225, Figure 3.
2. McKelvy, Presentation of the Case in Chief, in SUCCESSFUL JuRY TRIALS 187, 192
(J. Appleman ed. 1952).
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But despite such advice, the choice of both gross and internal order
rests upon assumptions which are as yet unsubstantiated. While the
effect of order on decision making has attracted the attention of psycho-
logical researchers, their work has little direct application to an adver-
sary legal process: they have focused on either external or internal
order; in the adversary model, the two factors always exist in com-
bination. Moreover, few of these studies have dealt with legal material
and none has been designed to include the essential characteristics of
the legal fact-finding process. The gravity of this flaw is demonstrated
by recent psychological investigations which conclude that any advan-
tage achieved from order is dependent upon such factors as the nature
of the material presented, the traits under consideration, the timing of
the presentation, and the instructions given to the decision-makers.3
This Comment reports an experiment designed to suggest the effect
of order in an adversary legal process. The experiment combines gross
and internal ordering in a setting incorporating the essential character-
istics of legal fact-finding.
I. Method
The experiment used a hypothetical case which could arise in either
a civil or criminal context.4 The case as explained was comprised of
fifty brief factual statements, divided equally into "lawful" and "un-
lawful" bits of evidence. Through the prior use of scaling procedures,5
3. For a recent survey of the psychological research on order of presentation see E.
JoxEs & G. GoETrHALs, ORDER EFFcrs x I mPREssiox Fop.ssAxrox: ArraintunoN CorsTXT
AxD THE NATURE OF THE EN'rrry (1971). Some of this prior research is summarized with
reference to the legal process in Lawson, Experimental Research on the Organization
of Persuasive Arguments: An Application to Courtroom Communications, 1970 L & it:
Soc. ORDER 579, 597-608.
4. The case was explained by a brief summary: Adams (the defendant) and Z*±mp
have been close friends for years. Recently they began to gamble heavily together and.
as matters became involved, they met at a tavern to discuss their relationship. After
a period of conversation Zemp knocked Adams to the floor and thrcw an object in
his direction. Adams responded by stabbing Zemp in the stomach whh a piece of
glass. The law provides that it is unlawful to use more force in repelling an attack
than a reasonable person would believe necessary in the same or similar circumstances.
5. In a pre-test, eighty-six facts about the case were divided by undergraduate sub-
jects into two categories, lawful and unlawful. Within these categories, the facts we:r
further divided into nine sub-classes to provide equal scale intervals on the strength
dimension within each of the two scales. Facts were selected for use if the subjects desig-
nated them lawful (or unlawful) at least seventy-five per cent of the time and if, within
a given level of strength, they were rated at that level with the smallest variance. In
order to insure that the units of strength (the degree to which the data influence the
subjects) would be the same across the strength dimensions for the two types of facts,
a more refined scaling technique was carried out on the selected fift), facts. Utilizing the
procedure described by Young and Cliff, both lawful and unlawful facts were compared
with the same set of standard facts. See F. Young & N. Cliff, Interactive Scaling with Indi-
vidual Subjects (THE L.L. THURSTONE PSYCHOMErRIC LAu. REt'. No. 94, 1971). This per-
mitted the scaling of the lawful and the unlawful facts on the same weak to strong con-
tinuum so that a unit of strength in the lawful presentation could be equalized with a
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the impact of each "lawful" bit on a subject (acting as typical juror)
was matched by an "unlawful" bit tending in the opposite direction.
Subjects were instructed to listen to the evidence and then decide
whether the defendant's acts were lawful or unlawful.
Into this setting the two variables of gross and internal order were
introduced: In the gross order variable, either the unlawful facts were
presented first, followed by the lawful facts, or vice versa; in the inter-
nal order variable all possible combinations of climactic and anticli-
mactic orderings within the two opposing presentations were com-
pared.7 Variations attributable to the individuals presenting the evi-
dence were controlled for by alternating roles.8
The effects of gross and internal ordering were measured by the
judgments of the subjects as to whether the defendant's action was
lawful or unlawful, and their certainty about those judgments. Each
side presented its twenty-five bits of evidence five at a time. After each
set of five bits had been presented, the subjects were asked to indicate
the extent to which they currently considered the defendant's actions
to be lawful or unlawful by checking a nine-point scale (one being
unlawful, nine being lawful). After the last set of facts, the subjects
were asked to indicate their final opinions on the case and their degree
of certainty.9
unit of strength in the unlawful presentation. Both of these scaling procedures produced
a distribution of lawful facts whose average strength was not statistically different from
that of the unlawful facts. Further, the two distributions were not statistically different
in their variability; in fact, the two distributions were remarkably similar. The fifty facts
selected for use are on file with the Yale Law Journal.
6. Each experimental session began when a group of undergraduate students re-
ported to a large conference room at a specified time. A long table was situated at
the front of the room, and two third year law students sat at opposite ends of the
table facing each other. The experimenter, a graduate student in psychology, sat at
the center of the table facing the participating undergraduate students. Each subject
was given an envelope containing the case summary and a series of questionnaires for
use in the test session.
7. The gross order comparison was created after the completion of the standard
preliminaries. The two law students were introduced to the subjects as the attorneys
for the defense and prosecution. These terms were adopted to differentiate the roles
for the subjects but not to suggest a criminal as opposed to a civil trial. In one.half
of the sessions, the subjects were told by the experimenter that the defense attorney
would present his evidence first and that the prosecution attorney would follow; this
procedure was then carried out. In the other sessions, the reverse order was announced
and followed throughout the session. In all sessions the appropriate attorney stood
and read aloud the lawful or unlawful facts, and then the second attorney presented
his case in the same manner.
The internal ordering variable was introduced by having one or both of the two
attorneys present their evidence in either the climactic (weak to strong) or anticlimactic
(strong to weak) order.
8. To keep any difference between the two students at a minimum, each dressed as lie
might for a court appearance and spoke in a matter-of-fact voice. The two attorneys
did not know prior to each session which side they would be representing or what
gross and internal sequences would be followed.
9. The terminal questionnaire also asked subjects how pertinent they thought the
facts were and whether they detected a trend in either presentation.
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II. Results
The subjects' final judgments are expressed in means in Table 1.
Larger means indicate results more favorable to the defense; smaller
means, more favorable to the prosecution.
Table 1 suggests that gross order does make a difference and that the
second presentor is in the more advantageous position. In three of the
four cases, the party going second obtained more favorable results.
Analysis of these data demonstrates that these column differences are
highly significant (p<.001).' 0
Table 1 also suggests important differences resulting from internal
ordering. Comparison of the appropriately paired rows"' reveals that a
climactic order in the first presentation produced substantially lower
final means when the prosecution went first (column two). When the
defense went first (column one), however, there was no corresponding
favorable effect to the defense; indeed, there was a mildly unfavorable
trend: Both climactic ordered means are slightly lower than their
paired means. Statistical analysis indicates that this differential effect
of internal order favorable to the climactic order (only when the prose-
cution went first) is highly significant (p<.001). As to second presen-
Table 1. Mean terminal judgments. The higher the score the more lawful the case
was judged.
Gross Order
Internal Order Defense First Prosecution First
Prosecution Second Defense Second
First Presentation weak to strong 3.94(18)- 3.73(5)
Second Presentation strong to weak
First Presentation weak to strong 2.84(19) 4.38(16)
Second Presentation weak to strong
First Presentation strong to weak 4.20(15) 5.84(19)
Second Presentation strong to weak
First Presentation strong to weak 3.0(20) 07(11
Second Presentation weak to strong
a Number of subjects in parentheses.
10. A difference is here considered "significant" when an appropriate statistical
analysis yields a result which would occur by chance less than five times in one
hundred instances, written as "p<.05." Smaller "p" values give even more assurance
the difference was not the result of chance.
II. For first presentations it is necessary to compare the means in such a wa) as to
hold constant differences within second presentations. Comparisons by column of the
mean in row one with the mean in row three (in which the second presentation was
anticlimactic) and row two with row four (in which the second presentation was climactic)
meet this requirement. These comparisons suggest that internal order within first presen.
tations makes a marked difference only for the prosecution and that cimiactic ordering is
the more effective.
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tations the data appear to indicate that a climactic order is effective for
both prosecution and defense. 12 Statistical analysis demonstrates the in-
ternal order difference (generally favorable to the climactic order) to
be only marginally significant (p<.052) and not significantly different
for defense and prosecution presentations.
Subjects' preliminary judgments, after they had heard different
amounts of evidence during the course of the presentations, were
plotted as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 depicts the developing effect of the evidence over the
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Fig. 1. Mean judgments based on internal order of first presentations,
ternal order during second presentations.
9
controlling In-
12. For second presentations, it is necessary to compare means in such a way as
to control for differences within first presentations. A comparison by colhn of row
one with row two (in which the first presentation was climactic) and row three with row
four (in which the first presentation was anticlimactic) meets this requirement.
l ! I I f l i I i I
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internal order within second presentations, the continued effect of the
first presentation internal order through the second presentation to a
final decision.'
3
Particularly noteworthy is the wide divergence over the first twenty-
five facts between the climactic and anticlimactic curves when the
prosecution presented first.'14 The two subsequent defense presenta-
tions also resulted in significantly different trends over time (p<.003).
When prosecution facts were presented in an anticlimactic order, the
defense presentations following them produced a dramatic increase
over time (p<.001); the defense facts following a prosecution case pre-
sented in a climactic order produced a significant (though less steep)
increase (p<.001).15 By contrast, when the defense went first, the cli-
mactic and anticlimactic curves are largely identical. Not surprisingly,
this similarity carijed through to the final judgments; there were no
significant differences in the trends of the prosecution presentations
following the two internal orders when defense presented first.
Figure 2 shows the developing effect of internal order over the entire
second presentations, controlling for the effect of internal order within
the preceding first presentations.10 It reveals that differences in the
internal order of the prosecution's case caused a divergence in prelimi-
nary judgments when the prosecution presented evidence second, simi-
lar to the divergences noted in Figure 1 when the prosecution went
first.' 7 However, in contrast to the lack of divergence in preliminary
judgments when defense presented first, as shown in Figure 1, Figure 2
13. Thus, in Figure 1, the point described by coordinates right 5 and up 2.07 shows
that when a climactic prosecution presentation came first, after the fifth group of
five facts had been presented, the mean judgment of the subjects was 2.07, %cry favorable
to the prosecution.
14. The curvilinear trends of both presentations are evident in Figure 1. These
trends are significantly different from one another (p<.001) in that the climactic order
produces a trend which is convex, whereas the anticlimactic order produces one which
is concave.
15. A further trend analysis revealed that the defense presentation following the
climactic prosecution presentation resulted in a significant quadratic trend (p<.001).
The defense facts following the anticlimactic prosecution presentation produced a
similar quadratic trend but one that was only marginally significant (p<.08 2 ).
16. Time five represents the state of opinion at the conclusion of the first presenta-
tions and thus constitutes the starting point for the second presentations. Figure 2 is
read in the same way as Figure 1. For example, in Figure 2, the point described by
coordinates right 9 and up 4.05 shows that when climactic prosecution presentations
came second, after the ninth set of five facts the mean current judgment of the subjects
is 4.05, mildly favorable to the prosecution.
17. Both prosecution presentations in the last five trials reveal linear trends that
are significantly different from each other (p<.011). Further analysis indicates that
the anticlimactic prosecution presentation has a significant concave quadratic trend
(p<.001) and, in fact, is significantly different (p<.001) from the climactic order,
which has a significant convex quadratic trend (p<.007).
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Fig. 2. Mean judgments based on internal order of second presentations, controlling in.
ternal order during first presentations.
reveals a definite divergence between the two curves for defense presen-
tations, though one less impressive than the prosecution effect.' 8
III. Discussion
The results of this experiment suggest that in a legal setting the
impact of the final bits of evidence, in both gross order and internal
order, is pervasive: In gross order, the side going second is strongly
18. Both the climactic and anticlimactic defense presentations resulted in significant
linear trends (p<.001), but these linear trends were not significantly different fron one
another. Similar to the prosecution data, the anticlimactic order of the defense presenta,
tion produces a convex quadratic trend (p<.001). This significant quadratic trend
contributed to the significant difference revealed by quadratic contrast analysis between
the two defense orders (p<.007); the climactic defense order produced no significant
quadratic trend.
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advantaged; internal order favors strong evidence occurring toward
the end of the presentation except when the defense presents first.
In seeking to account for the gross order results, it is important to
examine why facts presented first have less impact in a legal setting
than elsewhere. First impressions normally have strong impact when
individuals receive information about relatively stable characteristics
of others, such as attitudinal and personality dispositions and abili-
ties.19 However, the determination of whether another person has per-
formed an unlawful act entails judgments not on permanent charac-
teristics but rather on specific events. Thus the legal inquiry may
reduce the natural impact of this type of early information. 20 Another
circumstance thought to strengthen early impressions is a finding of
an inconsistency between earlier and later information.2 ' Once an early
impression is formed, later inconsistent information is often "dis-
counted" because the recipient of the information has relied on the first
impression. However, the recipient of the information presented by
each party in an adversary process knows that such information has
been screened by the advocate and is thus plainly incomplete. Luchins22
has shown that by forewarning subjects of the imminence of additional
information, the impact of early information is suppressed. Thus,
when fact-finders know that early information is imperfect and that
contrary information will follow, first impressions are not so strong
that later information will be discounted. Similarly, early information
presented in a legal setting is not likely to produce the strong bias that
may in other settings lead to the "assimilation" of subsequent infor-
mation.2 3 Moreover, even if fact-finders enter the case with a strong
19. See Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals & Ward, Pattern of Performance and Ability
Attribution: An Unexpected Primacy Effect, 10 J. OF PERs. & Soc Psycn. 317 (1968).
Subjects were found to "place greater weight on the first few clues about ability than
on subsequent information .... " Id. at 336.
20. This statement may not always be true. In E. JoNEs & R. NtsnITr, Tim Acroa AND
TrE Onsr vzR: DivERGENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE CAUSES OF BEIHAVIOR (1971), it is h)poth-
esized that there is a "pervasive tendency" for observers to attribute the causality
for an actor's behavior to stable dispositional factors. In the legal setting, this means
that decision-makers would be inclined to attribute lawful or unlawful beha ior to
moral qualities inherent in the defendant.
21. See Anderson & Jacobson, Effect of Stimulus Inconsistency and Discounting In-
structions in Personality Impression Formation, 2 J. OF PEm. & Soc. Psvca. 531 (1965);
cf. Hendrick & Costantini, Effects of Varying Trait Inconsistency and Response Require.
ments on the Primacy Effect in Impression Formation, 15 J. OF PERs. & Soc. Psvcu.
158 (1970).
22. Luchins, Primacy-Recency in Impression Formation, in THE ODnR OF PRisL. -
TION AND PERSUASION (C. Hovland ed. 1957).
23. See Thibaut & Ross, Commitment and Experience as Determinants of Assimnila.
tion and Contrast, 13 J. OF P.Rs. & Soc. Psyc,. 322 (1969). In any case, the later in-
formation in legal disputes is likely to be too discrepant from the earlier information
to permit assimilation. Cf. E. JONES & G. GOEmTALS, ORDER ErFcrs IN I.%IirnssoN
FORMATION: ATTRIBUTION CoNTExr AND THE NATuRE OF TIE E 'TITY (1971).
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bias toward the side presenting first, the adversary system is designed
to counter such biases.
Indeed, it appears that in legal settings it is the material presented
first which is discounted. Sears24 has demonstrated that fact-finders
exposed to only one side of a case (as compared with those exposed to
both sides) made less extreme judgments on the relative merits of the
presentation. This suggests that after having heard only the first pres-
entation, decision-makers in a legal setting will reserve judgment until
they have heard the remaining evidence. Moreover, Sears found that,
where subjects who had heard both sides of the case were approximately
equally interested in hearing additional information favoring one or
the other party, those who had heard only one side were not as in-
terested in receiving further information supporting that side but
rather preferred to hear information favoring the opposition. It is this
posture of legal fact-finders, with their suspension of commitment and
heightened receptivity to the subsequent presentation, that may favor
the party going second. Such effects are further promoted, of course,
by a sharpened recall of the more recently presented evidence.
As to internal order, strong evidence presented late in the argument
(as in the climactic order) carries greater weight than that which is
presented early (as in the anticlimactic order), particularly within the
second presentations. It is only when the defense presents first that the
climactic order carries no discernible advantage. This may be because
in legal fact-finding greater weight is given to discernible differences
in the strength of evidence presented by the advocate of guilt than to
equally discernible differences in the strength of evidence presented by
the advocate of innocence. Because "prizes" are not awarded for in-
creasing evidence of innocence but, rather, graduated penalties are
routinely calibrated to increasing evidence of guilt,2 5 fact-finders in a
legal setting may naturally be expected to place most weight on dif-
ferences in the strength of evidence of malfeasance.
What remains unclear is the presence, however weak, of internal-
order effects during the second presentation by the defense. One pos-
sible explanation is that second presentations by the defense were by
definition preceded by presentations by the prosecution, during which
the fact-finders weighed prosecution evidence. It is conceivable that
this prior experience of giving differential weight to weak and strong
facts presented by the prosecution may have so sensitized the subjects
24. Sears, Opinion Formation and Information Preferences in an Adversary Situation,
2 J. OF Exp. Soc. PSYCH. 130 (1966).
25. For a general discussion of this pervasive condition in Western culture, see L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 30-32 (2d ed. 1969).
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to such differential weighing that they carried the practice into tie
succeeding presentation by the defense. What the fact-finders would
not spontaneously do when the defense presented first, they were
prompted to do when it was presented second.
These gross-order phenomena can be expected in all adversary fact-
finding settings involving legal materials. The internal-order phe-
nomena can be expected in all criminal cases, where guilt is always
an issue, and in most civil cases where, directly or indirectly, the ques-
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Fig. 3. Mean judgments obtained in ideal condition: prosecution first, weak to strong.
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seven conditions are indicated by ticks.
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materials, and the second position is the more advantageous; (2) the
ordering of weak and strong elements within presentations also pro-
duces a difference in results, and the weak to strong (climactic) order
is the more effective. But this second finding is true regardless of gross
order only for the plaintiff or prosecution; the climactic order is ad-
vantageous for the defense only within second presentations and there
only to a relatively minor degree.
Assuming that the ideal order for adversary fact-finding is a sequence
of evidence which eliminates any advantage gained solely because of
order, these two findings suggest an optimal sequence for an adversary
system: The advocate asserting guilt or fault should go first and pre-
sent his case in a climactic order; the advocate defending should follow
and also present his case in a climactic order. Both advocates are thus
given effective resources: This sequence gives a gross order advantage
to the defense, offset by the climactic order advantage given to the pre-
ceding prosecution or plaintiff presentation. One of the groups in the
experiment heard the hypothetical case in this ideal sequence, and
Figure 3 shows the high degree of balance achieved. This result sug-
gests the value of the traditional adversary system in generating bal-
anced judgments by affording both parties fair access to their most
effective resources.
The system, with its traditional gross order for opening statements
and the presentation of evidence (prosecution or plaintiff first) pro-
vides the ideal order as long as both advocates follow their self-interest
and present their evidence in a climactic order. The traditional adver-
sary trial thus appears remarkably well arranged to neutralize the
effects of order and thus maintain the fact-finding process relatively
free of this powerful yet legally irrelevant influence.
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